Craig M. Chambers and Linda C. Chambers v. Smithfield City And Robert Richardson : Brief of Resp0Ndent, Smithfield City by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1983
Craig M. Chambers and Linda C. Chambers v.
Smithfield City And Robert Richardson : Brief of
Resp0Ndent, Smithfield City
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Steven R. Fuller and B.H. Harris; Attorneys for Respondent
Smithfield City
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Chambers v. Smithfield City, No. 19252 (1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4169
IN 'J'H8 SfJPREME COUR'T', STATE l)f' U'l'AH 
CRAIG M. CHAMBERS ann LINDA c. * 
CHA7•\TlB1'S, 
* 
Plaintiffs/Apnellants, 
* 
vs. 
* 
SMITHFIELD CITY ann R0B8R'T' 
RICHARDSON, * 
Def ennant/Resnonnent * 
Sunreme Court No. lg252 
BRIEF OF RESP0NDEN'T', SMI'T'HFIET,D CITY 
* * * * * 
Anpeal from the Jungment of the First District Court 
of Cache Countv, State of Utah 
Honorahle VeNov Christoffersen, Junge 
Davin 1'. Daines, Esq. 
Christooher L. Daines, Esq. 
Dl\TNES & S'HT'~ 
108 North Main, Suite ?01 
Lo~an, Utah R41?1 
Attorr1e"s for Plairiti ffs/ 
Ann<0llants 
Steven R. Fuller, Esa. 
B. H. Harris, Esq. 
HARRIS, PRES'I'ON, GU'l'KE 
& ('.HAMRERS 
11 Peneral Avenue 
Logan, TJtrih 84-:Pl 
Attornevs for Defennant/ 
Resnorinent Smithfieln r:itv 
W. Scott Rrirrett, Esq. 
Bl'\RRJ:'T'~' & BRADY 
"300 South »'1airi 
Logan, Utrih 84121 
Attornev for Defennant/ 
Resnonn~nt Robert Richarnson 
TABLE OF CON'l'EN'l'S 
NATURE OF' CASE • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 
D1SPOSITION BY "'RIAL COUR7 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• l 
DISPOSITION SOUGHT ON APPSAL ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1 
STATEMEN'!' OF FACTS ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 2 
QUESTIONS PRP.SP.NTED •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3 
ARGUMEN'!' ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 4 
I. THf: REVIEW P'\OCEDURES PRESr:'.RIRED IN 
THE CHl\LLP.NGED ORDINANCE ARE WITHIN 
"'HE COUN<:IL' S LEG1SLATIVE POWSRS AND 
DO NOT DIMINSH BUT RATHSR :i:NC-:REASE '!'HE 
PROCEDURAL RIGHTS GRANTED "'HE APPELLAN'!' 
UNDER UTAl-l LAW • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 4 
A. Anv alleqed defective notice procedure 
is excused or cured hv actual notice 
received or anticioation hv appellants 
at the \-ie2rinqs •••...•.•.••.•.•••.••••.••.•••••• ;:; 
I I. 'T'HP, ROA Rll OF AD.JTJSTMEN'T'S HAD '!'HE ATJTHORITY 
"'0 GRN'1T l\N ARP.A \TARIANCB "'0 CO-DJ'.:FENDAtl'!', 
1<.ICl-lARDSON ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 7 
A. A decision hv the Board of Adiustments 
sh0t1ln h~ o?ert11rned onlv if clectrlv an 
ahuse of niscretion or illeoal ......•.....•..•• 11 
R. Standau1 of revie1v on armectl •..•..•..•...•••••• l'i 
r:. "'he rlnctrine of self-crectten hardshin 
is inannlicahle as Richarnson din not 
create th'°' hctrdship ..•.••..••.•.•..••••••.••••• 18 
CnlWL\JS IOIJ •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 20 
i 
Reviserl Orrlinances of sniithfirlcl C1tv, TJL1h, 
Ch. 4-1(rl.}{'1) ..•............ , ............................. ~, r; 
Reviserl Orc1inances of .SPli.thfieln rit•r, TJtnl<, 
Ch. 10-4 ···········--······································· fi 
U.C.A. §.lr)-q-fi (lQ'i'l) •....•.••••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 'i 
U.C.A. §10-Q-7 (19Sl) .............•..... • · · •... · · • · • · • • · · • • • 5 
u.c.~. si_o-9-P (19S'll ............................... 7, s, 11 
ll.C.A. §17-77-16(3) (1953) .....••.....••..•..••••....•••.•. ll 
CASES CI'T'P.D 
Alumrii l__,t;Jt_1 n~_ B02rci v. C:it\ of Lin~oln, 
1'3 7 '' • ;.: • '·" ~ rl 0 (Ne 1-i • 1 q G 5 l . • •••••••.• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • q 
Anrlersor_ ''· Boarr'1 of Anoeals, '.J/. M.D. Anp. ?R, 
322 A. ?rl ?'.JrJ (lQ74) •..•••.••.••.••...•.•.••••••.••••..••••• 11 
Boarrl of Arliustment v. Kwi~-ri,eck Renltv, Inc., 
389m A. '.Jrl l?R9 (Del. 197.SJ .....•....•..•••.•••••••••••.•••• l? 
Boarcl of Aniustment:.s of Oklc,1101"1'1 Ci tv v. Shcinl-iour, 
435 P. '.Jn ')f)q (()kl. l_Q()'-l\ ................................... 19 
Coronet Homes Inc. ,,_ ~1cK~nzie, 
419 P. '.Jcl 'J_Q (;,ev. l9fili) .................................... 7 
Cottonwooc1 Heici'~ts Ci tiz"n' s ! .. c;soci0tion "· P··.'lrrl 
of C0mmi.ssio•1ers -:-if S'llt Lnke Co11ntv, 591 P. ?rlll8, 
rJtah 1_979) ...•..............••••.•.•.••••..•..••••••••.••.• IP, 
Ford Lea.sinq Development Comnanv v. Ronrcl of 
Countv C0mmissioners, 528 P.?rl '.J37 ~olo. 1974) •••••••.•••• 17 
Frcinklin Financi0l v. New Smnire Develooment Companv, 
659 P. '.Jn 10<'\f) (lltah 1981) .....•....•........••...•..•.• 14, 15 
Freeman v. Board of Arliustments of Citv of Grent Fnlls, 
34 P. ?.'l 534 (Mont. lg31\) .•.............•...•........••.• 8, 11 
ii 
Tn~ian Villaqp Manor Cnmnanv v. Detroit, Mich. Apo., 
r, Mich. App., 679, 147 N.W. ?.c1 711 (lq67) ••.••.••.•.••••••• l?. 
Jones v. Zoning Boarc1 of North Catasauqua, 
4'i'i A. '.>c1 754 (Pa 1983) •........••••••••.••••.•••.•••••• 19, 20 
Mclean v. Solev, Mc1. App., '.>70 Mc1. Aop. '.>08, 310 
A. '.>cl 783 (1973) •.•••••.•...•...•..•..•...•...••.....•..•••. 12 
Mueller v. Citv of Phoenix, 
102 Ariz. 575, 435 P. 2<1 47'.> (1%7) •.•.•....•••••••...•.•••• Hi 
Palmer v. Boarc1 of zoninq Ac11ustment, D.C. App., 
787 A. 2<1 ')35 (1972) ••.••..•.••••...••••..•••.••••.•.•••••• 12 
Parish of St. Anc1rews Protestant Eniscooal Church 
v. 7.oninq Roarc1 of Appeals of the Citv of Stamforc1, 
21'.> A. '.>c1 ql6 (Conn. 1-91)7) .....•••••••••.••••••.•••••••.•••• 15 
Rickarc1 v. Func1enherqer, 1 Kan.Apo.2n 
222, S63 P. 2<1 101)9 (1977) ••.......•••......•.•..•.••••• 11), 17 
Thurston v. Cache Countv, 
626 P •. '.>c1 440 ({Jtah 198l) 
Villaqe of Brnnxville v. Francis, l Aoo.niv.'.>c1 
2Vi, lSO N.Y.S.2c1 <JO'i; Aff'D 1 N.Y.?c1 g3q, lVi 
4, '), 6, 7 
N.E.'.>c1 7'.>4 (lq'i6) .•••.••••.••..•.•..•••....•••........••... 10 
Walton v. 'rracv Loan & "'rust Compilnv, 
97 U. 24CJ, 9'.> P.'.>n 7'.>4 (lq]<J) •.......•....••..... 8, q, 11, 13 
WcstMinistPr Corp. v. 7,oninq Sn. nf Review of the 
Cit;:;-;:)7-D;="n'1Irlenc<0, R..1. Sunc., 101 R.I. 381_, ?Vl 
~?;1~(101ir~ ....................................•..... 17 
~~~itcn~h \l. ~it'' oF rq,,1J~1·1a~~, 
r;1;;-i0~1ss- (CH:l.',nn. l98fll- •.••.•.••.•••.••.•••.•.•••••••. lG 
h'nlf ''· llis+:ric'c of <-0lum 1,ia R0arcl of 7,oninq An1ustm<0nt, 
T1q ;;~?nCJ1~;rrJ.c. App. l'l79) •.•.••••••••.••.•••••••••• i_7., 19 
F,Nl,Y\LOPEDii\S 
87. !1r:i. 1ur. '.>cl §?fl(), 7,oninq nnn :olanninq (lCJ7fi) •••••••• 19, '.>O 
iii 
'l'REA'T'ISF:S 
III Anderson, American Law of ~onino, 
Section 18. 47 (lqfi8) ...•.•••.......•..•.•.•..•••••. 10, 17., lfi 
Journal of Leoal Studies, Rriqham Younf) Tlniversitv 
Summarv of Utah Law: Land Use Zoninq and Eminent riomain, 
Section 11. l "l (lq7g) .....•......•.......••••••••••••.••..•• ll 
iv 
IN 'T'IlE SlJPREME C:OUR'T', STA'rE OP fJ'T'AH 
CRAIG M. CHAMBERS ~nil LINDA C. * 
CHAMBERS, 
Plaintiffs/Anpellants, 
vs. 
SMITHFIELD CITY and ROBERT 
RICHARDSON, 
Defendant/Respondent 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Sunreme Court No. 19252 
BRIEF OF RESPONDEN'T', SMITHFIET,D CITY 
* * * * * 
Anneal from the Judgment of the First District C:ourt 
of Cache Cnuntv, State of Utah 
Honorable VeNnv C:hristoffersen, Judqe 
David R. Daines, Esq. 
Christonher L. Daines, Esq. 
llAINBS & SMI"'J-1 
108 North Main, Suite ?~1 
Loq cm , fJ ta 11 R -13? l_ 
Attornnvs for Dl~intiffs/ 
i\nn10llant.s 
Steven R. Fuller, Esq. 
B. H. Harris, Esq. 
HARRIS, PRESTON, GUTKE 
& C:HAMB1'RS 
11 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Tltah 843?1 
At~nrne\1s fnr Defen~ant/ 
Resoo~d10nt Smithfield Citv 
~J •. Sr:oti: "8arrett, Bsg. 
P,T~RRS'T''T' i; P,Ri\DY 
100 South '·lain 
Logan, Utah 84121 
Attnrnev for Defendant/ 
Resnondent Rohert Richardson 
~;t even R. Fuller 
n. H. l!;nris 
fll\RRIS, PRES'l'ON, GU'l'KE & CHAMBERS 
Attnrnevs for Respondent Smithfield Citv 
ll Federal Avenue 
Lorian, T.Jti\l-i R4121 
1'elephone: (801) 752-35Sl 
1N THE SUPREME crnJR1', S'l'ATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG M. CHArv\BERS anrl LINDA C. * 
CHAMBERS, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
SMI'l'HFIELD CITY and ROBER"' 
RICHARDSON, 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Defendant/Respondent * 
NA'rURE OF 'T'l{E CASE 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, 
.SMI"'HFIBLD CITY 
Sunreme Court No. 19252 
'T'\-iis is an action brnnqht hv Plaintif:f.s tn enjoin the 
issuance of a huildinq permit hv Defendant, Smithfield Citv to 
cn-d0fendant, Rohert Ricl-iardson. 
DISPOSI'l'lON BY "'RIAL COURT 
Hrtvinq fo11nd tl1<> case> to he proner for suJTlmar 1r ~udqment, 
DISPOSITION SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
n<>fenrlant/Resoondent SJTlitl-ifield Citv, and Rohert Richardson 
(hereinafter "SJTlithfield Citv" and "Richardson") request that 
thP Trial Court's decision he affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Smithfielrl Citv accents the statement of Eacts as qiven hy 
the Aopellants in thei t hr ie1, hut ands Lil" fol_lnwinq summiHV and 
additional fRcts to fie consiClererl lw the "01Jrt. 
On !·la'' 27, 1CJ8?, Dursuant to the Reviser'! Orr1inances of 
Smithfielc1 Ci tu, Utah, Ch. 4-'.> (r1) (Ii) anrl after twice rleli-
berating anrl c1iscussinn the grant of a variRnce to co-Responrlent, 
Robert Richarrlson, the Smithfield Citv Board of Adjustment 
aoprover1 a lot (area) variance sought hu Richarrlson. Record at 
53, 54 (record hereinafter c1enoterl as R.). As part of the B1Jarr1' s 
review oft'·"' ·1rionce ar:mlication, t•·1el"e finrlinqs were stuclier1 
item IY.J itPrn 3S the·r relater> to the fact11al situation uncler con-
sic1eration anrl each item was voterl unon senaratelv before the 
variance •·1as pass2cl. (R. S7). Because the site for the orocosecl 
building is coned RE-l (reri11ir inq l. ;icre in area) ancl inasmucli 
as '·1r. Ric!F1 •:cl son ow1ccd . <,7 ~c· e, th,o lot liavinq he,011 snli t hv a 
RE-l cOfl(O. IR. s~). 
'.>-rl. Scecial questions. 
(Ii) '"'hene11er 11n11.s11 l rircumst.once>s exist, tf1e Smithf c"l'l 
Cit" r,011ncil ma'' rira.nt Vclr innr,r::~-; fnr bui lrlnci ournos0 ~ 
on an inclivirlual lot hasis or pi,oce of pronert••, even 
thouql1 sairl huilrlinq ancl/or lot ma" not ho in c1Jnformance 
with existing zoninq laws. The Smithfielcl Citv Council 
will consider s•ich exceotions onl'' •·1hen recrnnmennprl bv 
hoth the Boarcl of Ac1'justments ancl the Planning C:1Jmmission. 
-;>-
Cine<, anprO'Jal hv the> Ro;url of Arljustmc>nt was ohtainerl, the 
1 iancc> was rliscussPrl anrl approverl hv the Smithfield Planning & 
'nninq Cnmmission anrl the Citv Council. (R. S4, 'iO, 40). At 
Jn~st one nf the Plaintiffs was present at the meetings where 
tlw variance, was discussc,rl. (Citv Co11ncil, R.40; Planning & 
:'nninq Commission, R.4S, 47; Boarrl of Adjustmc,nts, R.'i7-, 54). 
From AoPellants' own complaint, it is evirlent that they not 
nnlv attc,nrlerl the hearings on the variance, Proposal but also 
receiverl notice of the same. "In all cases the Plaintiff 
nhiecterl to the variance uoon receiving notice of the ahove men-
t inn00 lv=:i.-:irin<l." (R.?). 
~he final grant of the variance precipitaterl a law suit by 
~ n0iqhhoring lanrl owners, Apnellants herein, attemotinq to enjoin 
ll1n is,-;u;ince> of a h•1ilrlinq Permit anrl to rleclare> invalid the 
nr o::r::i ii 11 t- es 11 nrlt? r 1\1h irh t11~ vri. r i ri.nr::~ was qr an terl. 
0UES~TONS PRESEN~ED 
l. ·~~?~~ a rit'' ro11nsil retains R right t0 rP,1ie 1~ ''soe~ial 
<111-,'-:!:io,-," rlr>cisions rv1rlP hv a "loetrrl of ArljnstrnPnt, hrive the 
/\iJlJr·ll-1.ntc:.; rici'lhhc)r_-irifl lnnrl0 1·,n1 1-=:ir.c:;, her::n rl~nierl certn.in proce-
rlu-,_-- ,1} r i q h t_c~ 11 n 10 r ~J ta 11 1 a. '·J? 
?. Ts et iincirrl Gf Arl~11st;nPnt rictinq withiri its authoritv 
,,,;-1<>;1 t•10 "lrietrcl opproves tl1c> qr-cin t of a 7'oninq variance allowinq 
'' huilclinq nen1it to iss11'= on a .C:,7 acre lot iri an area 
rGstrirte~ to on~ ~ere lots? 
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1\RGflMEN'r 
I. 'T'TJE REVIEW PR()('>:flTJRF;S PRESCRIRJ-:n 1N '!'HE CHALLENGED 
0RDil'1\l'l\:E ARE !H'"Jlill 'T'HF, comwrr~' s LEGISLA'T'IVE POW<.:RS Arm 
DO NO"' DTMINSH RlJ'r ~"'HER I'lCREASE '!'HE PROCEDURAL RIGWT'S 
GRAN'T'ED '!'HT:: 1\ PPELT,AN"' UNDER U'T'l\ll LAW. 
1t is Ancellants' contention that the review crovisions of 
the Srnithfielr1 Citv Otninancc, somehow harms the Appellants hv 
violatinq a rrocenural riqht. 1t is niff icult to unrlerstand 
wherein the Accellants have heen harmerl inasmuch as the challenqe~ 
orrlinancc, actuallv grants the Acnellants qreater procerlural 
safequarrls. P,ccorrling tG Anoellants, •vhen the Boarrl of An:iustrnent 
Neverthelrss, the Orrlinance requires the 
approval of hoth the Planninq & Zoninq Commission anrl the 
Smithfielrl Citv Council hefor•' s11cfi a variance, is qranterl. 
Ancellants' cosition is incnmnatihle with itself; thev 
Countv Bnar0 of Anjucotment was firml·1 est<,hlishc;n in ~hurston 
v. Cache Countv, r;:u; P.20 440 (Ut0h l_QR1). '!'fie situation there 
-4-
i~ rlirPctlv analoqous to a municipal council and its respective 
Gnilrrl of Arljustment. In Thurston at .141), the r:o11rt .stated: 
~0ither is there anv requirement that, in making such 
n c1eleqation of authoritv, the r:o1mtv r:ommission must 
s1irrender all control or Dower of revie•v; the Board 
of Arl1ustm,c>nts is constituterl hv st;it11te il forum for 
review of nll administriltive zoning decisions, hut 
nn1·1hRre is it marlR the> exclusive reposi torv of annel-
latR Dowers. Should the r:ountv Commission elect not 
to hestow upon thE> Roarrl of Ad1ustmRnts the power to 
issue spE>cial exceptions hut to Plnce s11ch power in 
thR Planning Commission instead, and to rRserve to 
itself final Sa'' in thR dispensation of such exceptions, 
we cannot sav that it has sought to clothe itself with 
iluthoritv not granted bv the Legislature. 
~ooellants ilttempt to distinquish Thurston hv pointing out 
t 11;it "''iurston dealt •vith a C:ountv Commi.ssirm's review of a con-
ditional use Permit. ADPellants overlook the filct that the 
issue in Thurston was orocedural in nature and that the orin-
ciol" of la1·1 co:n,oundRrl bv t'1e Court is oirectl'' on ooint in this 
Desoite Anoell;int's assertion that n orohihition of variance 
r~vi·?".7 1J\' 2 C'i'=\' Cnuncil i:; 11 irrtnlicit: i.n t11e entir~ frarnewor~ of 
:=:,i_,°li_ 21-1:;"',. (7\n~~ll~nt's ~,-i~f, n~q~ 17) Aoo,c>llants rearl far 
as n r:it,1 Boilrd of Arljustment is ilooointerl by the City Co1incil 
(fl.C.A. !lHJ-9-7), the Thurston Cnurt, at 446, staterl: 
Plaintiffs' interpretation of the Enahlinq Act, 
moreover, imooses a cur io11s a<'lministrative oarodox 
on countv zoning systems 1~i thin the state. 
-5-
RV law, the cnuntv comrnissinn is the borlv which 
ini tiallv fnrnes the, o;:nninCJ res0l11tinn, unnn re-
commenrlation frnm the planninq cornmlssinn. lt is 
the t,0 ,sk nf the cn1rnt'' commissinn tn rlecirle which 
uses will be oermitterl in which znninq rlistricts, 
irnrl urmn whcit', if anv, conrliti0ns. Plaintiffs' 
intPrpretation woulrl rrocp1ire the Conntv Cnmmissinn 
to ociss all arlministrative cnntrnl over thP imnlemen-
tation of sn mucl: nf n nlcin as relates to soecial 
exceoti•Jns, conrJiLional 11sps, anrl the lii<e, to a 
suhorrlinatc> fJorlv, which ceases to he answprahle to 
thP commission itself. NntwithstanrJing the tact 
that the countv c0mmissinn wo11lrJ retilin whi"ltever 
contr<)l it rlesirerl nver t 11r:e iss11i"lnCP of reqnli"lr 
builrlinq ne>rmits, i'· «1ni1lr1 be rlPrn:iv<>rl of i"lnv suoer-
visor,- DO'·.ier over t 11r::- issuanc~ of an'' 11 specia.l ex-
centinns". Assnminq, aro11<>nrlo, thi"lt such "special 
exce>ntion.s", are conrJitionill 11sp nermits, we ci"lnnot 
i"lqre>e thcit siJch an nr'oitrarv senaration of power was 
within the cnntemnlation of thP leoislnture. 
Leqislat11re to hci"e nrovirlf'rl for i"l Cit'' Bonrcl of Adjustment, "i"l 
Council itsr>lf. 'T'l,urston, s•1ora. l 
,-.,,_ i".i,n.,; all0<iPrl r1efer::ti,1e nntlcA nrnc::erl11re is excus~n or 
curen hv 0ci:11,1l 110tic~ rPcei, 7i=:,-l nr n~rtir:iD~tinn hv Ano~llants 
at the hecirinos. 
thev werr:e inj11rerl hv all,cqPrJl·1 i'1cir1err1JntC' provisi0n.s for notic:e 
1 It is also arqu"r1 that the' rr0 ,,ie1.,, nroc1"r11Jre>s of the> <;mi ichfielrl 
Citv orainancf' qo he"0nr1 tl1f' enahl i nCJ stnt11tf' makinq All acti0ns 
taken thereunrlro~ voirl. Were this thf' case, th0 rnorf' appropriate 
juclicinl resnon.se "loulrl be to Sf'"er the offenr1in11 lcinq11aqr' 0f tlw 
ordinance rather than rle>clcire th• entirP orrlincince anrl all 
actions tai<en bv thP Roi"lu1 •10irl. Suc:'i il s0,1eri"lnc:e is nro·1irlerl 
for bu orrlinance>. Srnithfi 0 lrl Citv, Utah, Orrlinances, Ch. 10-4. 
-fi-
in the Smithfield Ordinance. (R.?). (Annellants' Brief at 18) 
In Thurston, sunra, at 447, the Utilh Court hrusher:l a similar 
1·nntnntinn asirle as ''h~rml~ss error'' e~ren if s11ch a ~efect were 
round to have e~ister:l. "'1-ie Crnirt said: 
It is conceder1 hv all n;ntie.s tl-iat hoth plaintiffs 
were nresent at the hearinos which dealt with the 
matters here under conside~ation. As such, thev 
were afforded an adequate onnortunitv to hear and 
disnutP th" reilson>' 1J'1derlvinq the count'' action. 
Commonlv, the presence of iln ohjectinq nartv at the 
hearing c11r10s most dl"fici10ncies in notice requirements 
relatinq thereto. 
In surn1;1;ic.1, Anciellants' arguments with reqarns to nrocedural 
infirrnities noint to alleq10d defects which m;iv or mav not exist, 
have sufferer1 due to SIJ(:l1 ;illeged defects or infirmities. In 
fact, Aonellants ha~" he~efited From oreater procednral rights 
than those friund iri otl1er rn11'1icinciliti<0s 1·1itho11t an ordinance 
1 I. 'Vi-if: no;,··-U) C)iC )',[),1\l.~'Di\":'l'T' l{T,;) 'T'l{C: A!J'l'l-{ORI'T'Y '!'0 GRAN'!' Al'! 
,=~!\-=-',"!_,, 'T\P,T '"'"',:" '·1 :) ('1)-~}-~·-,- ·1~.,;-_,,i,1--:1 , Rir:H..u,.ru1so~1. 
,~;]~ ~ l_ 11-_ ·l r- ~ -:r- n' :'""" nrl • ~ .\!IT)• s1·1-CJ-l 'l (l q 'i 3) 
,:-i u •_ 11 n r i 7~c:; !--1 () ~ t. 1:1'-, ·_ ·rl'~ 'l t tri o·-Ant . l ~xc~Dtions '" SD0<:1A--'-
Without the r<0lief 
providRd hv a ''ciri;irice procedurR, sorne courts l1cive indicateil 
that th" confiscC1torv cind in<0q11itcihlR nature inherent in a 
zoning svstem might not withstC!nil constitutional scrutinv. 
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In Freeman v. Boarrl of Arliustments of Citv of Great Falls, 14 
importanr,e of n. uarianr0 u.11tl,r)rit_v: 
It is therefore anD?Jr"nt thcit tlv0 nrovision for ci 
board of adjustment (or similcir fact-finrlinn horlv) 
vested with hro2rl ncncrcil Dowers, is imnortcint to the 
validitv o( the zoninn ordinance 2nrl the stcitute under 
which it was enacterl. Jn the cihsence of such a board 
V'?Sted ,.,1i th power to nr~·;ent tti1=; in~q11al i ti~s an<i in-
iustices 1-1hich T" • .inhi_ r·then'ise res1ilt from a strict 
enforcement of tl.eo 7'.Jr,inu nr.~inr,nc2, there would be 
grave doubts as to thP cons ti t1itionali tv of tr1e 
orrlinance and the stal:1ite unr1pr 1-1hich it was enacted. 
As a creature of st0tnte, th'? 001·1Prs o:f a Citv Boarrl of 
Adjustment are onlv so broad or so narrow as dictated bv the 
A reaainq of 
the foregoinq stat11l:e reveals thc;t tl1e L'?qislature has qiven a 
the Board t0 specific objec1:i·,1e r0s;:1 ictinn~. It has tl-iereforP 
fallen to the r,011rtc; to mnr.~ f= 11. 
:·'cil tnr: 5.s PCJ'. i lv distirin11ishprl from 
the nrRsent c;;sp. (R,8l\ 
the Salt Lcike City Board of Adjustments nermitting t'1P erRctinn 
of a gasolinP SRrvice station in a rRsirlential area (n prohihite~ 
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:1~~0 in tl-)ot narticnlar zone), was an irnoroner exercise of the 
TjOArrl's f)Ower. 
\·JA holcl therefore that the Boarrl of Arl-justment has 
no oower to f)ermit or authorize the use of orooertv 
for, or the erection or construction of a huilclinq 
clesiqnecl to he usecl for, anv nuroose or use not oer-
mittecl within s11ch clistrict l)y the terrns----;::JI the 7.oninq 
Orrlinance of Salt Lake Citv; ... 
(Bmohasis adrlerl) 
The entire ooinion of the Court is reolete with references to a 
change in use whereas the oresent case involves a variance in 
area onlv. Therefore, Walton clearlv rliverqes from the oresent 
case and other cases involvinq areci variances. 
The variance requested hv Richardson does not contemolate a 
change of use hut merelv ci reduction in cirea or lot si~e from 
the RE-1 or one-acre resirlential estcite zone. Richardson's 
cipolication for R 8uilr1inq oermit for "home occuoation" ancl a 
'
1 sinqle fafl"lilu rlwPllinri" ns ~art of A. 11 resirlentinl estate 
neiqhhorhoor1" nr<' ner111i 1:t:erl aw1 i:-1t:enrle'1 useoc; unr1er this zoniriq 
classif:ication. (R..~'l). 
This 
Clistiriction ivacc ?.rtir:ulC1tec1 in 1'\l1mni Control BoaI:r1 "· Citv of 
A use variance is orie which r>ermits a use other than 
that nrescriherl bv the zoning orrlinance in ?. particular 
rlistrict. An area variance has no relationship to a 
chanqR of use. lt is orimarilv a qrant to erect, alter 
or 11sr' a stt·ur:t11re for a r>erillittiorl 11sA in a manner 
othAr than that orescriherl l)y the restrictions of the 
zoriinq nrrlinancc,. 
variance is tCial courts ha·•e l10ld areil variancPs should he 
considered in coniuction with the less demandinq "cractical 
diffic11lties" stannarc1 fotncl ill many state statutes. In Villaqe 
of Bronxville"· Francis, 1 Apn.Div.'.Jn ?Vi, l'in N.Y.S.2rl 906; 
.'\ff'D 1 N.Y.?n 8'39, ll'i N.C:.'.'n 7?4 (lCJ'i6), a variance from the 
local zoning orninance was oralltPn "so as to nermit trie 
construction of a hank: h11ildilln r:ontilininq fl0or area in evress 
of trie amount cermi tter1 hv t'lc:e ordin;rncc:e." "'hc:e Court went on to 
sav at qrJ9: 
T.\Jhen th~ vari~nr:~ is onP of or;::;,'1 nnlu, th~re is nn 
Change in thA cl)ara< . er oF t'JP ~011C nistrict and the 
consinerati0ns n•c:esent in the Otto r:ase are nnt nresent. 
A chanrie of area ma" '>e qrantP--l on tric:e qround of crac-
tical difficulties al0lle, •«itho•1t consine.-inq whethc:er 
or not tl1c:erc:e is all •1WF'cc:essar•1 harnsCiin. Wite omitten) 
'!'his co1Jrt is committPd to tri" nile that, ill the nhsence 
of statutorv orovisir,,1 to tI1e contrarv, snecial '1arrl-
ships need not he estahlishecl as a condition to grantinq 
an areA vari~nce. 
'Tl-iis crise was dis~uS."" 
Secti0n 18.47 (lO!;R): 
Tl-1e f':our:: ~i~:;t:i.-·--: 1is 110'-1 s11.:::~1_-l)l·1 l1r'1:·\1r~(-:n ,-,,,-ea '73.rianccs, 
which if1 17 ()]_•.rr: r~·1, cnt. 1Jc:,cl-:, 1__~'~ '.:.~·~r;:.r,._~, ?-.:Jc:;itir, nr 
siinil;::ir ,-co.qulati011'::: .-::r.rl 'J'.=',~ 1 1,~r"'..:'.J:nc.~-s, 1\ 1 hir:l1 nermit: ;::i, 
USP Droscri~1erl hv T- 110 ,~,,- -j n_r,nr:P. I~ 1v)t: nnJ v fourirl t'1at 
11 practical rlif~ic11lti0s" n.nr~ 11 1Jnripr,p~:;c:ar'l h,-.r'1ships 11 1·1ere 
rlistinct standarr1s, f-iut tlv;t Racl1 IV"\S intRnr1e 1 to liniit 
the Roarrl' s 001-·t?r to cira.nt ,-, nar1:ir:11lnr l<inO of variance. 
'T'he Court helrl th:'lt t'1<0 .Stein'1ilhPr req11irF>mRnt of un-
necessRrv hardship limit 0 rl the cownr of R Boarcl of ~oninq 
Anneals t0 grant u~n ~1ar inncr:.s, iJ11t ti-int area variances 
couln be cirantPd 1m0n R showi'lq tl1at a li ter;,l RPnlic;,tion 
of the coni'lq req11Lotinns h'0•1ld re>s11lt in pr;,cticRl dif-
ficulties. 
(Emphasis AdrJc:ed) 
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This concept was reaffirmed in Anderson v. Board of Appeals, 
'.l? M.D. Ano. ?8, 322 A. 7-d ·no, ':l::>f'.\ (lq74) wherein the Marvland 
Court of Anpeals stated: 
IJse variances are customarilv concerned with "hardship" 
cases, here the land cannot vield a reasonahle return 
if used onlv in accordance with the use restriction of 
the ordinance and a variance must be permitted to avoid 
confiscatory operation of the ordinance, while area 
variances are customarilv concerned with "practical 
difficultv". 
Following the decision in \~alton in lq3q, the Utah 
Leqislature modified the standard or test to be used in the 
orantinq of a variance. In iq4q, the Tltah Leqislature added the 
Practical "difficult"" tPst to the "hardship" standaro bv the 
adilition of paraqraoh (3) (a) to U.C.A. §10-9-12.?. (1'153) The 
amenilment imolies that the Leqislature intendeo a different test 
be aoplied. 3 This trena has been followed b" other courts. In 
2 U.C.A. §llJ-0-17(3) (a) 
(3) ( ••• ) Before anv vari2nce m2'1 'le autl1ori~er1, it s'iall rie 
s'imm that: 
(2) th~ varian~e ~!ill ~nt s·1l1st~ntiallv aff~ct t11~ comorehensivP 
Plan of zonina in the cltv and tha~ adherance to the strict 
letter of the ordinanc~ will cause difticulties and 'iardships, 
the imoosition of which uonn the oetitioner is unnecessarv in 
order to carry out the qeneral ouroose of the plan. 
(Emphasis adoed). 
3 Se>e ,1ournal of TJeC]al Studies, BriC]ham Youn(] TJniversitv, 
St1mmar'' of: Utal-i La<v: T,and Use zonin'l and Eminent Domain, 
Section 11.13 (lg7CJ). 'C''ie anther states that "the inclusion of 
a term 'practical CliFtic'lltiios' in Sections 11)-Q-l:? (3) (a) and 
17-27-lf'.\(3) of the Utah Code came ahout after a oecision in 
Walton wl-iicl-i ~ight nossiblv inoicate that the legislature did 
recoqni:".e two standards that necessarilv shoulo be apolied to 
two t"pes of variances". 
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Board of Adiustment v. Kwik-Check Realtv, Tnr., 1R9 A.?d l/.R9, 
17-91 (Del. 1978) the Delaware C'.rJurt constn1f'd a statute simi 11r 
to the Utah zoninq Law and held: 
•.• that the Superior rourt correctlv rlistinquisherl 
the two tvoes of varianc:f'S and nrf'sc:rihf'rl a less 
hurrlensome test where an arf'a v~rianc:f' is in issuf' 
undf'r Section l_lS?(a)(".). Mani/ stat<>s, 1,iith compar-
able statutorv provisions, have adoptf'd such an in-
terprf'tation. (S<>e cases citPd helow) 4 Thf' rational, 
which we aoprove is that a usf' variance chanqes the 
character of the zoned district bv oermittinq an 
otherwise proscrihed use, (cite omitted), whereas an 
area variance concerns onlv the practical difficultv 
in using the Particular propertv for a permitted use. 
It is onlv logical to assume a less strinqent standarrl for 
an area variance: 
An area variance relating to restrictions such as side 
vard, rear vard, frontaqr, sethack or minimum lot 
requirements, does not alter the c'iaracter of the 
zoned district, whereas a us~ variance s~eks A u~~ 
ordinarilv prohi~ited in thf' nartic11lar district. 
(Bmnhas is acHerl) 
397 A. ?d 'l3G, 941 (D.C. l\nn. lQ7~) 
not necessarv for rJisnostion of i:::l1is case, 1)111::. t.11~ reas0ninq 
behind the standard is su~rnitted for the Court's consideration. 
4 . . 
- See Indian Village Manor Comnanv v. Detroit, Mich. Ann., I) 
Mich. Apo., fi79, 147 N.W. ?rl 711 (l'll)7); w,,stMinist"r Coro. v. 
Zoning R~. of Rf'view of the Citv of Providf'nre, R.I. Supr., 101 
R.I. 381, 218 A. ~d 1Sl (lqf)R); PalmPr v. Boarrl of 7,onin<i 
Adiustment, D.C. Apo., ?.87 A. ?.cl 51S (l972), and Mclean v. 
Sole", Mel. Aym., ?.70 ~ld. App. ?.08, 1.10 A. 7d 78.1 (l971). Sef' 
also 1 Anderson, American Law of Zoninq, Sf'ction 14.~5 et Sf'q. 
(1968). 
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In the present case, the Smithfield Citv Board of Adjustments 
found that both difficulties and hardships would be imposed upon 
thP applicant if his permit was not granted. (R.57 at para. h). 
After Walton, supra, it is clear that a Board of 
Adjustments does not have the riqht to grant a use variance, but 
it seems to be the contention of the Appellant that the Board of 
Adjustments be rendered virtuallv imPOtent, powerless to grant 
even an area variance. The parameters of the Board of 
Adjustment's authority are not so constricted. In Freeman, 
suora, at S37, the Montana Court addressed this ooint: 
Apoellant contends that the board of adjustment did 
not have the power to authori~e the issuance of the 
permit to Clark. In this connection it is suggested 
that the varLition "lhich the borird has the power to 
make refers onlv to sliqht variations, such as the 
heiqht of a building, o~ the distance it must be 
from the street, etc. We find little merit in this 
contention. Ohviouslv, the Legislature could not fix 
anv definite rule that would fit everv individual case 
of alleged hardship. The authoritv conferred uoon the 
!Joarcl was, of necessitv, of a general nat11re and dis-
cretionarv. 
Althouoh anpellants would use the dicta of the Walton Court 
to confine variances to "detail and construction" in the 
granting of building oermits, but it does not apnear from the 
cc;sc,s or the statutes t!-iat s11ch a limited function was intended. 
(Acpellant's Brief prige 8). 
A. A decision bv the Board of Adiustment should be over-
turned only if clearlv an abuse of discretion or illegal. 
An examination of the record, reveals that considerable 
time and effort was scent by all tl-iree governmental bodies 
involved in dicussing and deliberating the variance request made 
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by Mr. Richardson. More than one meeting was held in which 
Appellant and others appeared and voiced their opinions. (R. 40, 
45, 47, 50, 'i3, and S4). In addition, in the discussion of the 
proposed variance, as recorded in the minutes of each meeting, 
the Board of Adjustments examined twelve separate areas of cri-
tical importance and found, after voting uPon each, that the 
variance could pass. (R. 'i7). 
Appellant's brief repeatedly refers to "no evidence" or 
"nothing in the record" to support the Trial Court's granting of 
Summary ,ludqment and indeed implies that such juc:lgment was 
"orematt1re". (See Anpellant's Brief pages 5, e:;, 9 l'.2, 13 and l'i). 
Nevertheless, there is no direct challenge that this case was 
not a proper one for summary judgment. The facts are not in 
disoute and nowhere has Aopellants alleger'l bv affidavit or 
otherwise that such a dispute exists. If the Appellants were 
aware of conflicting evidence that would lead to a disputed 
material fact, then it is their burrlen to brinq forth sur::h eui-
dence to the Trial Court. In a rer::ent Uta~ case, Fran~lin 
Financial v. Ne1v Empire f"levelripm 0 nt CrimPanv, i;59 P •. 'M 1040, lrJ44 
(Utah lg81), it was asserted on appe;il that sul'lmarv jud0ment was 
inapprooriate as the adv10rse Dilrtv's s11pportinq affir'lavits were 
r'lefective. 'T'he Court said: 
Bowever, it is axiomatic thilt miltters not presented 
to the trial court mav not he raised for the first 
time on appeal. 
The Court also held at 1044: 
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The opnonent of the motion, once a nrima facia case 
for summary judgment has heen made must file responsive 
affidavits raising factual issues, or risk the Trial 
Court's conclusion that there are no factual issues. 
Rule S!i (e). 
Apnellants mav now wish for a more comnlete record on 
appeal, but the burden was theirs to contest the evidence or 
bring forth missing facts by affidavit. Thev are now critical 
of the Board's findings as incomnlete or not specific enough, 
yet nowhere do the statutes require such specif icitv. (Annellants' 
Brief at 13). A similar issue was quic\.:ly aisnosed of in 
Parish of St. Andrews Protestant Enisconal Church v. Zoning 
Board of Appeals of the Citv of Stamford, 232 A.2d q1fi, 920 
(Conn. 1%7): 
To find error in the manner in which the board made 
its reauired findings or that those findings did not 
fully ~omnlv with the standards enumerated in the 
regulations would compel this court to indulge "in 
a microsconic search for technical inf irmiti~s" in 
t11e boarrl' s action anrl would unscrunulo11slv interfere 
with "tr1e legitimat<: acti,1ities of ciuic arlministrative 
boards". (Cite omitted) 
Inasmuch as there are no resnonsive af f idauits alleging contra-
verted facts or thP lac\.: thereof, Apnellant's repetitious 
reference to "no evirlen~r:.: 11 it that t11° l1irlqi'1ent hr,:i,s "nrernat1Jre' 1 
"I. Standarrl of R"uiPW on .".-::meal. 
When a partv atternnts to overturn a decision bv an adminis-
trative zoning authoritv, it must first overcome a presumption 
of correctness and validity which attaches to the decision by 
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such an authoritv. Courts have qPnerallv deferred to the dPci-
sion of a Board of ArljustrnPnt as the Board makes its decision 
based on personal kn01-1lerlqe nf the propertv, the -:>:oned area cind 
after full discussion at rneetinqs held bv the Board. 
The standcird for an appellate review of such a decision was 
carefullv stated in Whitcomb v. Citv of Woodward, 616 P.~d 455, 
456 (Okl.App. 1980): 
278. 
The granting or denial of a variance is within the 
sound discr~tion of the municipal zoninq official 
and the boards of cidiustment. (Cite omitted) Aooeals 
from the decisions of the boards of adiustment are 
to the District Court and the cause is tried de novo. 
These Proceedings are equitable in nature. Therefore, 
the scope of review of this Court is not to substitute 
its judgment for that of the trial court, hut rather 
to determine whether the trial court has abused its 
discretion. Unless clearlv aqainst the weight of the 
evidence, the judgment of the tricil court will not be 
disturbed. (Cite omitted) 
In variance cases a oresumotion exists in favor of the 
correctness of the determination arrived at bv the 
board of adiustment. Whe~ this rletermination has been 
affirmed bv. the> district r:o,1rt on cirmeal, this presump-
tion is entitled to areat ~eight. (Cite omitted) 
substitute its jurlqment for that of both the Trial Court and the 
Board of Adjustment. 
222, 5fi1 P. 2d 1069, 1072 (l'l77) the Knnsas Court considere>d an 
action by a neighborinci land owner to enioin construction of a 
buildinq in an area ~oned residential. The 7,oninq Board of 
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Appeals ref11serJ to cancel the Defenoant' s builoing Permit, but 
at trial the District Court reoucea the size of the huiloing the 
Appellctnt co11lo constr11ct. "'he Apnellate Court re1Tersed this 
oecision emnhasizinq the imPortance of the role of the zoning 
Boara of Anpeals. "'he Court sctio: 
The law in Kansas is clear that neither a trial court 
nor an appellate court can suhstitute its juogment for 
that of the Boaro of zoning Anpeals in matters other 
than law or essentiallv juoici~l matters, ano neither 
court can oeclare the hoaro's actions unreasonahle 
unless clearlv compellea to ao so hv the e1Tidence. 
(r:i tes omitted) 
( ... ) 
From the recora it is clear the '!'rial Court exceeoed 
the permissible extent of jurJicictl review and substi-
t1Iter1 its jungment for that of the Roctro of zoning 
Appeals of Lvons, Kansas. "'hat it r::oulo not ao. 
'!'1-ie majriritv of Apnellant' s arqument, Points I (A) (R) 
anrJ (C) nf Apnc:llants I l-)r ief r is nirectea tn•'laras askinq this 
Cnurt to stanr1 in the olace of tl-ie BoarrJ of Arljustment ana act 
as a tvpe of "super zoning cnmrnission". Pora Leasinq 
Development Cornnanv v. Board of Cnuntv Commissioners, 528 P.2d 
conclusinns marl"" 1-:Jv t'1p 1'02rr1 of l\r1:i1ist 1n"nts" ;onn "inr1ependentlv 
examine the rer::orrJ to spe i~ the snirit of the orrlinance was 
violated", but the hurnen of persuasion ana evioence was upon 
the Aonellants nrior to their takinq this anneal. (Anpellants' 
Brief p.9) The nres11mption nf cnrrectness that attaches to a 
rJecision bv a Rnara nf Arljustment will not generallv be inter-
ferrea with unless that hurrlen is met. "'1-iis princinle was 
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discussed in Cottonwood Heiqhts Citizen's Association v. Board 
of Commissioners of Salt Lilke Countv, 593 P. ~d Ll8, 140 (Utah 
1979) wherein the ~ourt held: 
Due to the comolexitv of factors involved in the matter 
of zoninq, as ln other fields where courts review the 
actions of administratiue bodies, it should be assumed 
that those chilrqed with that responsibilitv (the 
Commission) have specialized knowledge in that field. 
Accordingly, they should be allowed a comparatively 
wide latitude of discretion; and their actions endowed 
with a oresumption of correctness and validity which 
the courts should not interfere with unless it is shown 
that there is no reasonable basis to justifv the action 
taken. 
(Emphasis Added) 
Respondents submit that Appellants have failed to show there wils 
no "reasonable basis to justifv the action taken" by the 
Smithfield Cit" Board of Adjustment and therefore the decision 
should stand. Cottonwood Heiqhts, supra. 
C. The doctrine of self-created hardship is inapplicable 
as Richardson did not creilte the hardship. 
It is Appellant's contention that Richardson knew or should 
have known prior to purchasinq the propertv of the one-acre 
zoning restriction and therefore he should bP nrohibited from 
buildinn on the lot. ~he Trial ~ourt direcllv addressed this 
argument and stated at R.81: 
Richardson himself did not create the problem because 
it was the nrevio11s owner that split the lots •vhich 
are subject to the one-acre restriction. Richardson 
and the seconcl par tv 1voc1lr1 not f-Je alloc1ed to makP use 
of the orooertv nor would an'rone else •vho subsequentlv 
bouqht from them if this •vere to be riqidlv applierl, 
and unless the propertv was rezoned, probably set for-
ever unused for anv purpose. 
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If Utah were to adoot the doctrine as espoused bv Appellants, 
the whole purpose behind the enactment of variance procedures 
would be undermined. Prooertv would be held inalterablv fixed 
in its present condition without recourse for relief or change 
except for an entire rezoninq. 
Other courts have held that a better rule is to approach 
each variance on a case-bv-case basis to determine if it meets 
the standards for the grant of a variance descite crevious 
restrictions. In Board of Adiustment of Oklahoma Citv v. 
Shanbonr, 43'i P.7.d sr:;g, 'i75 (Okl. lgf)8) tl-ie Court discussed what 
it felt to be a better rule: 
Board 
Altl-iough New York and several other states hold that 
purchase of Procertv witl-i knowledge, actual or presumed, 
of restrictions contained in zoning ordinances prohibit 
the purchaser from seekinq any variance from such res-
trict ions, it is ouc opinion that the better rule and 
the one followed in a number of jurisdictions is that 
such purchase does not orohihit the granting of a 
variance. See 2 Rathkoof, suora,[The law of ?,oning 
and Planninq ()r1l Bd.) l.h. 1\8] Section 7-, an'l cases 
cited therein. In our view, were we to hold that such 
a ourc\-iaseo 1.;as a self-il'loosed hrtrdsl-iin, an unr1ue 
restriction woul'l be placed upon a purcl-iaser, who, 
ciltl-io11gh he was a'JlR to show that the oneration of 
a zoning ordinanre unon the pronectv di'l create an 
unneces~a i_-v 1-iar~t,-i1i J, woulr3 ~A hat-rF?rl. fro111 sr.=Akinq 
rRlief:. 
See al';O 'colf, SUT)l_-o_, g 4'i ~ ,_ ',_ ft. ' and ,1ones ~.7 • '7,oninq 
of Nortl-i Catris3u3ua, 4'i'i A. ?d 754, 7 'i'i (Pa. 19 s)) at 
Ti1e rul~, ascribed to bv Apnellants, is more correctlv 
ft. 
statRd in iP Am. ,)ur. 2d §<SO, ?,oning and Planninq (1976): 
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4. 
In any event, though, the courts are fairlv well agreed 
that a variance mav not he granted to the owner of a 
substandard lot where the applicant rleliheratelv 
created the s~hstandar~ nature of the lot. 
(Emphasis adrled) 
This statement of the rule oresents a more logical approach to 
the question of self-creat 0 rl hardship. Since Richardson rlirl not 
create the "suhstandarrl nat ire of the lot", he and his successorc 
in interest should not be bound to such a harsh restriction which 
would deny the existence of anv exception, despitP the hardships 
or di ff ic11l ti es imoosed. 
CONCLUSION 
The q~~stion of whether or not to grant a zoning variance 
is one of particular local concern. Local authorities are 
generallv familiar with the nePrls ann act1Jal circ1Jmstances of 
the comm1Jnitv ann are in the hest nosition to plan the ornerlv 
growth ann expansion of the co ,,~uni tv. 
The grant of a .33 acre vari;irice bv the Boarn of Arlj11stments 
in conjunction with the i·lcinniriri anrl Zoninr1 Corunission anrl Citv 
Council, "lfter rlllr> c r" and rl'°liheration, ic; not o·:tsirle the scrici•' 
rriv"' intc:qri _v r"" t ~P 0vera.ll znninci 
plan remains intact anrl the ~~irit of the ordinance has not heen 
altererl. 
Appellants hav0 olainlv receiverl all orocerlur;il rights to 
which thev are entitlen and more. ~heir orotests as to a lac~ 
of procedural saf eguarns is ;i smo~e-screen to ohscure the fact 
that thev have receiven greater orocenur;il Protection than that 
-/,0-
to which they normally would be entitled in the absence of the 
challenged ordinance. 
For the reasons and authorities cited herein, the undersigned 
respectfully requests this Court to affirm the decision of the 
Trial Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of November, 1983. 
HARRIS 1/PRESTON '<.c;;rJT/K} & CH~MBERS 
}-.. / .. // 
By: ~////11.~ £//fj." 
Bv: ~::.~~-!/):~~ 
B. H. Harris, 
Attorneys for: 
Respondent/Smithfield Citv 
Co-Defendant, Robert Richardson joins in this Brief by 
Smithfied City and elects not to file additional authoritv as 
the issues oresented are amplv covered herein. 
W. Scott Barrett 
Attornev for Co-Resoondent 
Rohert Richardson 
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MAILING CER'l'IF'TCA'T'E 
I herehv certifv that I rnailen a tr11e and correct copy of 
the above ann foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDP,N'T', SMITHFIELD CI'T'Y, to 
the following: 
Davin R. Daines, Esq. 
Christopher L. Dain~s, Esq. 
DAINES & SMITH 
108 North Main, Suite 203 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attornevs for Plaintiffs/Acoellants 
W. Scott Barrett, Esq. 
BARRETT & BRl\.DY 
300 South Main 
Loqan, Utah R43~1 
Attornev for Defenr1ant/ 
Responnent Robert Richarnson 
on this ~ nav of Novernher, 198 3. I 
~, 
/// :/ 
Steven R. F'~ller 
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